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Abstract: Noël Carroll’s influence on the contemporary debate on the horror genre is hard to overestimate. 
His work on the topic is often celebrated as one of the best instances of interdisciplinary dialogue between film 
studies and philosophy of art. It has provided the foundations for the contemporary study of horror in art. 
Yet, for all the critical attention that his views on horror have attracted over the years, little scrutiny has been 
given to the nature itself of the emotion of horror in the genre. This paper offers a critical understanding of 
the nature of the emotion of horror for Carroll, with a view to informing future investigations into the nature 
of horror in film (and beyond). 
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1. Introduction 
The contemporary literature on horror is one of the best instances of interdisciplinary dialogue 
between film studies and philosophy of art. The central influence on this literature has for a while 
been film scholar and philosopher of art Noël Carroll. The main focus of this literature has been 
the apparent paradox of our deriving pleasure from horrible (fictional) characters and events (this 
is the so-called ‘paradox of horror’). Various criticisms have been raised against Carroll’s so-called 
‘cognitivist solution’ to the paradox, and alternative solutions have been proposed.1 Although 
Carroll explicitly identifies the horror genre with the affective response that is appropriate to 
works in the genre, however, little critical attention has been devoted to the nature of this affective 
state.2 Following Carroll, the standard story in this respect is that horror fictions warrant a 
combination of fear and disgust. In his chapter on “Horror” in the Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
and Film, for instance, Aaron Smuts presupposes, without ever questioning it, the view that horror 
 
1 See e.g. Susan Feagin, “Monsters, Disgust and Fascination”, Philosophical Studies 65 (1992), 75–84, Berys Gaut, 
“The Paradox of Horror”, British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1993), 333–345, and “The Enjoyment Theory of Horror: 
A response to Carroll”, British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995), 284–289. 
2 The following two essays are exceptions in that they do contain critical discussions of the nature of horror as an 
affective response: Robert Solomon, “Real Horror”, in his In Defense of Sentimentality (Oxford University Press, 
2004), 108–130, and Andrea Sauchelli, “Horror and Mood”, American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2014), 39–50. 
However, Solomon’s essay focuses on the response that is appropriate to real, as opposed to artistic horror. 
Sauchelli, by contrast, briefly discusses Carroll’s view before proposing a radically different view of horror in art as 
a mood. 
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fictions warrant fear and disgust.3 Or, to mention another example, Katerina Bantinaki assumes 
the same view as “pretheoretical”, without any argument or references in its support.4 And, 
indeed, from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) to the latest instalment in the Hannibal Lecter 
saga (Hannibal, 2013–2015), many works of horror disgust at the same time as they horrify. In 
what follows, however, I will offer some critical remarks on Carroll’s view of the nature of the 
affective reaction of horror. In particular, I will unpack the details of his view and provide reasons 
to reject his understanding of disgust in terms of categorial violation. I will conclude by suggesting 
that further research is needed on the nature of the appropriate affective response to horror. 
 
2. Art-horror 
Carroll characterizes what he calls ‘art-horror’, i.e. the distinctive emotional response that is 
appropriate to works of fiction in the horror genre, as a response that is appropriate to horror 
“monsters”.5 On Carroll’s terminology, “monsters” are actually (as opposed to fictionally) 
impossible beings, or beings “whose existence is not countenanced by science”.6 Moreover, horror 
monsters are fearsome and impure. The response of art-horror is modelled on the response that 
characters in the relevant fictions are described as having when beset by those monsters. Art-
 
3 Smuts, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, ed. by P. Livingston and C. Plantinga (Routledge, 2009), 
505–514, 505. 
4 Bantinaki, “The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a positive emotion”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (2012), 
383–392, 383. 
5 Carroll’s label is somewhat misleading, since it makes reference to art even though his focus is fictions. This can 
produce areas of ambiguity, since there are horror fictions that are not art and artistic horror that is not fiction (see 
Sauchelli (2014), 41). However, most artistic horror is indeed fiction and the examples discussed in the literature 
are almost always works of art.  
6 Carroll (1990), 68. Many have, however, disputed Carroll’s claim that monsters are necessary components of 
horror: see Gaut (1993). 
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horror is a response to dangerousness and impurity. On the most precise specification of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for art-horror that Carroll provides, 
 
I [as an audience member] am occurrently art-horrified by some monster X, say Dracula, 
if and only if 1) I am in some state of abnormal, physically felt agitation [...] which 2) has 
been caused by a) the thought: that Dracula is a possible being; and by the evaluative 
thoughts: that b) said Dracula has the property of being [...] threatening [...] and that c) 
said Dracula has the property of being impure...7 
 
Dangerousness warrants fear, whereas “abomination, nausea, shuddering, revulsion, disgust, etc.” 
are the “characteristic” responses to impurity. Disgust however appears to have a central role, as 
in the book Carroll predominantly mentions disgust at the expense of all other alleged responses 
to impurity, e.g. abomination, nausea etc. As a consequence, Carroll concludes, “[a]rt-horror 
requires evaluation both in terms of threat and disgust”.8 
 
Note, however, that, in the quoted passage, Carroll refers to the causes of the emotional response. 
This is misleading as in most other places Carroll formulates his view in terms of evaluation or 
appropriateness. Although in many cases the cause of an emotion and its intentional object 
coincide, the two can also come apart.9 Moreover, as expressed in the above, Carroll’s is not so 
 
7 Carroll (1990), 27. 
8 Carroll (1990), 28. 
9 Consider for example Wendy, who is angry at Bernie because she believes he stole her car, when in fact the thief 
was Angela. It is possible to construct this scenario in a way that attributes no causal role to Bernie; but Wendy’s 
anger is directed at him (de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press, 1987), 110 ff). 
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much a general definition of—or a complete specification of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for—art-horror, as it is a characterization of art-horror in the case in which a monster is 
the emotion’s intentional object. The scope of the “if and only if” is crucial in this respect: Carroll 
says “I am … art-horrified by some monster X … if and only if...”, rather than “I am art-horrified if 
and only if...” In the passage, Carroll leaves this difference of scope unremarked upon, nor does 
he appear to put much weight on the difference elsewhere. The difference does matter on the 
assumption that art-horror is an emotion the features of which vary with the intentional object it 
is directed to. However, Carroll does not say anything that would suggest that he understands art-
horror as variable in this sense. 
 
On a different point, it is tempting to characterize Carroll’s view as the view that art-horror is a 
mixture of fear and disgust. However, Carroll does not take an explicit stance on the 
characterization of the emotional response of art-horror as: (1) a mixed emotion composed of 
(some of) the (phenomenological, physiological, evaluative, behavioural etc. aspects of the) two 
emotions, (2) just the co-occurrence of the two emotions, or, finally, (3) an emotion even more 
different from fear and disgust than (1) and (2). Instead, his chief preoccupation is with establishing 
the evaluative cognition that is proper to art-horror: “it is the evaluative components of the theory 
that primarily serve to individuate art-horror”.10 Indeed, it is difficult to reconstruct which of (1), 
(2) or (3) Carroll might endorse. If the monsters of horror fictions are both fearsome and 
disgusting, then fear and disgust would both seem to be emotions elicited in horror. This is so 
unless the co-occurrence of the fearsome and of the disgusting that is distinctive of horror 
 
10 Carroll (1990), 28. 
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somehow cancels out both fear and disgust to leave just the horror. But this is something that 
Carroll never suggests is happening. 
 
Furthermore, Carroll says that the evidence for his characterization of art-horror comes from the 
manifestations of emotional responses that the characters of horror fictions display. For instance, 
he says, “I found expressions and gestures of disgust as a regularly recurring feature of characters’ 
reactions in horror fictions”.11 This suggests that fear and disgust are emotional responses 
appropriate to horror fictions, alongside art-horror. Indeed, given the kind of evidence that 
Carroll relies on, one has reason to go even further. If all the evidence Carroll has for his theory 
involves the expressions of fear and disgust that fictional characters manifest in horror fictions, 
then the most that Carroll is warranted in claiming is (2), i.e. that art-horror is just (a name for) 
the co-occurrence of fear and disgust. Any claim such as (1) or (3), i.e. one that postulates an 
emotional response that is over and above both fear and disgust, is unwarranted—unless there is 
evidence of phenomenological, physiological, evaluative etc. patterns of response that are 
different from the simple co-occurrence of those of fear and disgust. But I do not find any such 
evidence in Carroll. 
 
3. Impurity 
Beyond these ambiguities, Carroll goes on to qualify impurity by tying it to the notion of categorial 
violation. In doing so, he adopts a view of impurity based on Mary Douglas’s anthropological work 
on pollution and dirt.12 On such a view, something is impure if it violates “the boundaries of the 
 
11 Carroll (1990), 30. 
12 In Douglas, Purity and Danger (Routledge, 1966/2003). 
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deep categories of a culture’s conceptual scheme”.13 On the face of it, however, Carroll here 
provides only a sufficient condition for impurity. So it is still possible, on his account, that some 
impure things are not categorially violating. Nevertheless, he is clear that categorial violation is 
the key notion to understanding impurity in the case of horror monsters: “the monsters of the 
horror genre [...] are beings or creatures that specialize in [categorial violation]”.14 
 
However, Mary Douglas’s original theory is not straightforwardly a theory of disgust. Douglas’s 
theory explains concepts and behaviours related to impurity, in terms of the violation of deep 
categorial boundaries. According to her theory, a given culture considers some things as impure 
because they threaten the validity of that culture’s categorization of the world. Nonetheless, as 
Douglas characterizes it, the class of impure things does include many common disgust elicitors 
(e.g. faeces). Moreover, although disgust is never explicitly mentioned in her 1966 book (which 
predates the more recent blossoming of research on disgust), she does mention disgust in the 2003 
preface to the Routledge Classics edition of her book.15 Indeed, Douglas’s theory is now often 
understood as a theory of disgust.16 
 
On the Douglas-inspired theory that Carroll endorses, disgusting things are such in virtue of their 
ambiguous ontological status. For faeces, for instance, the ambiguity would be “in terms of 
 
13 Carroll (1990), 32. 
14 Carroll (1990), 32. 
15 Douglas (1966/2003), xvii, emphasis mine: “[B]iologists have thought that dirt, in the form of bodily excretions, 
produces a universal feeling of disgust. They should remember that there is no such thing as dirt; no single item is 
dirty apart from a particular system of classification”. 
16 See e.g. Edward Royzman and John Sabini, “Something it takes to be an emotion: The interesting case of disgust”, 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (2001), 29–58, 40–41. 
16 Carroll (1990), 32. 
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categorical oppositions such as me/not me, inside/outside, and living/dead”.17 However, this 
Douglas-inspired theory is out of touch with the contemporary understanding of disgust that has 
developed over the last three decades of theoretical and empirical research. Ample evidence 
suggests that disgust was evolutionarily selected as a defence mechanism against the biological 
threat posed to human life by poisons and parasites.18 An account in terms of categorial violation 
has difficulty explaining this evidence, as it is unlikely that human cultural categories developed in 
such a way as to leave pathogenic substances systematically in violation of, or at the interstices 
between, those categories (for one thing, deep cultural categories deal with much more than just 
illness and oral incorporation). 
 
A Douglas-inspired theory of disgust also suffers from the fatal flaw of being unable to predict 
very common members of the class of disgusting things. For instance, it does not rule out of this 
class categorially interstitial things such as robots: regardless of whether they are animate or 
inanimate creatures, robots rarely gross us out. Although certain very realistic robotic devices 
may be said to be uncanny, they are not typically disgusting. Among other prominent 
categorially violating kinds of things that do not commonly disgust are oddities in the fauna (e.g. 
penguins: birds or mammals?), flora (e.g. dwarf trees), holes (are they objects or not?) and 
 
17 Carroll (1990), 32. 
18 See e.g. Valerie Curtis and A. Biran, “Dirt, disgust, and disease”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44 (2001), 
17–21, and Daniel Kelly, Yuck! (MIT Press, 2011). A slightly more dated, but still quite influential, view in 
experimental psychology is that disgust is at its core a defence from oral incorporation (Paul Rozin and April Fallon, 
“A perspective on disgust”, Psychological Review 94 (1987), 23–41). This view is not incompatible with the 
evolutionary, pathogen-avoidance view (see Rozin, “On the origin of disgust”, Emotion Researcher, 
<http://emotionresearcher.com/on-the-origin-of-disgust/>). Moreover, it, too, is at odds with a Douglas-
inspired theory of disgust: see Rozin and Fallon (1987), 29. 
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many others.19 At the same time, a Douglas-inspired theory of disgust excludes from the class of 
disgusting things many otherwise obvious members. All sorts of animals (insects, spiders, pigs 
etc.) are disgusting for many people and in many cultures. However, many such animals would 
seem to fall straightforwardly into perfectly legitimate categories.20 
 
One can certainly make efforts to save this Douglas-inspired theory of disgust from each of these 
counterexamples. For instance, one could say that insects are disgusting in many cultures because 
interstitial between the category of mammals and that of birds. But, then, one would have to 
explain why, for example, people in New Guinea eat fried grasshoppers.21 In some cases, such an 
endeavour might even have good chances of success. One can for instance suggest that, in a 
particular culture, certain categories are or are not sufficiently central or “deep”. But, ultimately, 
attempts of this kind are likely difficult to accomplish successfully given the number of 
counterexamples that can be brought against the theory. 
 
An even bigger problem with categorial violation is that it is a vague and very porous notion—
especially when it is applied to entire human cultures. For one thing, vagueness is a concern. What 
exactly are the deep categories of a culture’s conceptual scheme? Which cultural categories are 
deep, and which are shallow? It looks as though a great deal of discretion is going to be needed in 
order to work with Carroll’s notion of impurity. This does in turn raise concerns about the notion’s 
theoretical usefulness. Moreover, there are bound to be lots of different categorial systems in any 
one culture, many of which are implicit, ill-defined or inconsistent. Also, the boundaries of many 
 
19 See Royzman and Sabini (2001), 40–1. 
20 Cf. Rozin and Fallon, “A perspective on disgust”. 
21 Cf. also Rachel Herz, That’s Disgusting: Unraveling the mysteries of repulsion (W.W. Norton, 2012). 
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of these categories are likely to be vague. All of this means that a theory of disgust based on 
categorial violation is significantly slippery in escaping falsification, at the expense of theoretical 
usefulness and power of prediction. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have raised concerns about Carroll’s account of the affective response that is distinctive of horror 
fictions. Part of the account’s implausibility, I have argued, is due to the role that impurity plays 
in it. By adopting a more plausible account of disgust, however, it would still be possible to 
endorse a view of horror as the juxtaposition of fear and disgust. Such a view, however, would 
need to be decoupled from either one of Carroll’s other central claims: viz. (a) that monsters are 
essential to horror fictions, and (b) that monsters are essentially categorially violating. A case in 
point are robots or autonomous machines, such as those one sees as monsters/protagonists in 
Christine (1983) or Duel (1971). As I have argued, while these may be categorially violating, they 
are not for this reason disgusting. As a consequence, such monsters cannot as such be the source 
of the disgust that is appropriate to horror fictions. Nonetheless, monsters may be sources of 
disgust in other ways, perhaps in virtue of the blood and gore that their actions cause. So, if one 
is happy to decouple it from Carroll’s claims about horror monsters, one can still have a coherent 
view of horror as the juxtaposition of fear and disgust. However, this will mean sacrificing the 
unity of Carroll’s account of horror as an artistic genre that essentially involves both monsters and 
the juxtaposition of fear and disgust. Once this unity is dissolved, then it is worth probing further 
the question of whether it is indeed the case that there is an affective response, distinctive of 
horror, that is constituted by the juxtaposition of fear and disgust. 
